We study certain classes of supermodular and submodular games which are symmetric with respect to material payo¤s but in which not all players seek to maximize their material payo¤s. Speci…cally, a subset of players have negatively interdependent preferences and care not only about their own material payo¤s but also about their payo¤s relative to others. We identify su¢cient conditions under which members of the latter group have a strategic advantage in the following sense: at all intragroup symmetric equilibria of the game, they earn strictly higher material payo¤s than do players who seek to maximize their material payo¤s. We show that these conditions are satis…ed by a number of games of economic importance, and discuss the implications of these …ndings for the evolutionary theory of preference formation and the theory of Cournot competition.
Introduction
A fundamental ingredient of most economic models is the hypothesis of independent preferences: agents choose their actions with the sole purpose of maximizing their own material payo¤s regardless of how their actions a¤ect the payo¤s of other individuals. While this postulate is seldom given explicit justi…cation, it appears to be based on the intuition that those individuals who are willing to make material sacri…ces to a¤ect the payo¤s of others will lose wealth relative to those who are unwilling to do so, with the eventual consequence that the latter will come to dominate the economy. In this case, the maximization of one's own material payo¤s would simply be a pre-condition for survival in an environment where a competitive selection process is at work. While this intuition may be persuasive in the context of perfectly competitive environments, it can be seriously misleading when applied to strategic settings, for it is not generally true in such environments that agents who pursue the maximization of their own material payo¤s will obtain higher material payo¤s in equilibrium than symmetrically placed individuals who maximize other objective functions. Indeed, at least in some strategic environments, the reverse may be true.
This last point has been demonstrated in the literature mostly by means of particular speci…cations of Cournot oligopoly models. For instance, Vickers (1984) and Fershtman and Judd (1987) have shown in the context of such models (with linear demand and cost functions) that a …rm whose objective function gives a positive weight to its relative pro…ts or sales will outperform the absolute pro…t maximizers in terms of absolute pro…ts. It can also be shown that similar results obtain in some other strategic environments, such as common pool resource and public good games , in which agents with negatively interdependent preferences (that is, those who care about both absolute and relative payo¤s) may well obtain greater absolute payo¤s in equilibrium than do symmetrically placed absolute payo¤ maximizers. In such environments, interdependent preferences may be said to yield a strategic advantage to those who possess them.
While it is useful to know that interdependent preferences yield a strategic advantage in the particular examples that have been considered in the literature to date, it is di¢cult to judge the broader signi…cance of such …ndings without some assessment of the extent to which such results can be generalized. Our purpose in this paper is to provide a fairly general analysis of the issue, and to show that the cases in which negatively interdependent preferences yield an unambiguous strategic advantage over independent preferences are far more common than one might at …rst expect. We consider the general classes of supermodular and submodular games in which only a subset of players have independent objective functions whereas the rest have negatively interdependent preferences. Informally stated, we identify several sets of su¢cient conditions under which the members of the latter group have a strategic advantage in the following sense: at all intragroup symmetric equilibria, the in-terdependent individuals earn higher material payo¤s than do players who seek to maximize their own material payo¤s. We also show that there are simple symmetric games in which players with independent preferences unambiguously outperform those with interdependent preferences in terms of absolute payo¤s.
These …ndings may be considered interesting in their own right, since they relate the familiar notions of strategic complementarities and substitutabilities to the possibility that an envious concern with the payo¤s of others may lead one to have greater absolute payo¤s in equilibrium than those obtained by (absolute) payo¤ maximizers. Moreover, these results achieve a useful level of generality, for it turns out that our su¢ciency conditions are satis…ed by a number of games which play central roles in various branches of economic theory, including the Cournot oligopoly, input and public good games, search models and arms races.
The main …ndings of this paper …nd immediate application in at least two contexts. Our …rst application concerns the theory of preference formation. Evolutionary models of preference formation are typically based on the assumption that the selection dynamics are payo¤ monotonic: the population share of those endowed with preferences that are more highly rewarded materially increases relative to the population share of those who are less highly rewarded (see, among others, Rogers, 1994 , Bergstrom, 1995 and Robson, 1996 . In the presence of such payo¤ monotonic selection dynamics, our results enable us to identify the evolutionary stability properties of absolute payo¤ maximizing behavior. Speci…cally, with respect to the economic environments studied here, we are able to show that the long run population composition cannot be a monomorphic one composed only of absolute payo¤ maximizers. While this does not preclude the persistent presence of independent agents in the population, it calls into question the common practice of modeling economic agents exclusively as absolute payo¤ maximizers.
Secondly, our …ndings have some interesting implications for the analysis of oligopolistic industries. This stems from the fact that executive managers may in some circumstances either choose or be given incentives by owners to incorporate relative pro…t (or market share) concerns into their decision making. For example, when shareholders cannot calculate the potential pro…ts of the …rm under di¤erent action choices, managers may well seek to occupy a higher rank in the industry distribution of pro…ts so as to demonstrate their success. Alternatively, as advanced by several authors, there may exist informational reasons for owners to provide incentives to their managers that cause the latter to be concerned with the …rm's performance relative to those of similarly situated competing …rms. In particular, if managers' e¤orts are unobservable by owners and there is some common uncertainty a¤ecting all …rms in the industry, owners may bene…t from making their managers' compensation contingent upon relative as well as absolute pro…ts (Holmström, 1982 , and Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz, 1983). As a corollary of our results, we …nd here that such contracts may yield an unplanned strategic advantage to a …rm in terms of its absolute pro…ts. Since this advantage is not based on technological or marketing superiority, it helps provide a novel explanation for the evident inequality of market shares even in industries which are composed of …rms operating with very similar technologies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our general framework and formalize the nature of the present inquiry. Section 3 contains our main results which identify certain classes of supermodular and submodular games in which interdependent agents have a strategic advantage over independent agents in all intragroup symmetric equilibria. Examples of several commonly studied games that belong to these classes are also presented in this section. Finally, in Section 4 we elaborate on the implications of our main …ndings for the theories of preference formation and Cournot competition. We conclude with a discussion of directions for future research, and an appendix containing the proofs of our results.
The Framework
Since our ultimate aim is to compare the performances of di¤erent preference structures in terms of monetary outcomes, we shall concentrate on games in strategic form in which no player has an a priori advantage in terms of the primitives of the game. Consequently, our focus will be exclusively on symmetric games. Given any integers n > 2 and`> 1; we let ¡ stand for a symmetric n-person normal form game with an`-dimensional action space. That is, ¡ = (X; f¼ r g r=1;:::;n ) where X µ R`and ¼ r : X n ! R are the action space and the absolute payo¤ function of player r; and where we have ¼ r (x 1 ; :::; x n ) = ¼ ¾(r) (x ¾(1) ; :::; x ¾(n) ) 8x r 2 X and r = 1; :::; n
for any swap operator ¾ on f1; :::; ng:
1 As is usually done in applied and experimental game theory, we interpret ¼ r as the material payo¤ function of player r: Moreover, we assume that ¡ satis…es the following nonnegativity conditions:
and r = 1; :::; n:
These conditions allow us interpret the notion of "relative payo¤s" in the usual sense. 2 Finally, we denote the class of all ¡ that satisfy (2) by G, and let N (¡) stand for the set of 1 A swap operator ¾ on f1; :::; ng is a permutation on f1; :::; ng such that jfr : ¾(r) 6 = rgj = 2:
2 When ¼ r is bounded from below, the requirement in (2) is not restrictive. For by adding jinf x2X ¼ r (x)j to ¼ r , we obtain a new game which satis…es (2) and which is strategically equivalent to the original game; see the examples given in Section 3.3.
all Nash equilibria of ¡ 2 G.
In what follows, we endow R`with a partial order % to obtain an ordered vector space.
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In fact, we shall often take X to be a chain, i.e., assume that % linearly (completely) orders X. We note that the linearity of the order % does not turn out to be demanding as a structural assumption in many applications. Indeed, in numerous economic contexts`is taken to be 1; i.e. X µ R; in which case there is a natural linear order on X: Therefore, insofar as such games are concerned, the assumption that X is completely ordered is without loss of generality. On the other hand, when`> 1; depending on the economic context, one may linearly order X by means of any completion of the coordinatewise ordering such as the lexicographic, leximin or leximax orderings. Throughout this paper we assume that the set of players consists of two di¤erent types, namely, independent and (negatively) interdependent players. The independent players are those who are absolute payo¤ maximizers in the usual sense; the objective function of an independent player i is precisely her own monetary payo¤ function ¼ i : On the other hand, (negatively) interdependent players are concerned not only with their absolute payo¤s, but also with how their absolute payo¤s compare with the average payo¤ in the game. Let ¹ ¼´1 n P ¼ r denote the average (absolute) payo¤ function on X n , and de…ne the relative payo¤ of player j as follows:
The objective function of an interdependent player j is given by x 7 ! F (¼ j ; ½ j ) where F is an arbitrary strictly increasing real function on R 2 + : This particular way of representing negatively interdependent preferences has recently been proposed and axiomatically characterized by Ok and Koçkesen (1997) . In particular, when ¡ is played between individuals (as opposed to, say, …rms), the preferences represented in this form can be interpreted as a compromise between the standard case where one is assumed to care only about her monetary earnings ¼ j , and the extreme case where she is concerned exclusively with her relative payo¤ in the game, i.e., with ½ j (the latter case corresponds to Duesenberry's relative income hypothesis.) 5 If, on the other hand, ¡ is an oligopoly game, then an interdependent player 3 A partial order % on R`is a relation on R`which is re ‡exive, transitive and antisymmetric. (As usual, we write Â for % n =.) We say that (R`; %) is an ordered vector (or Riesz) space; if % is a partial order, and if, for any x; y 2 R`with x % y; we have x + z % y + z and¸x %¸y for all z 2 R`and¸> 0: 4 We use the convention of setting ½ j (x) = 0 whenever ¼ j (x) = 0 to avoid the di¢culty of evaluating the indeterminate form 0=0: 5 Special cases of this representation of interdependent preferences are utilized in numerous economic contexts ranging from models of optimal income taxation to experimental bargaining games. We refer the reader to the references cited in Ok and Koçkesen (1997) and Koçkesen et al. (1997) .
with such an objective function can be thought of as a …rm (or manager) who targets the maximization of not only its pro…ts but also its pro…t share in the industry.
Let us then assume that precisely k 2 f1; :::; n¡1g many players in ¡ 2 G are independent. We de…ne the n-person normal form game ¡ F (k) = (X; fp r g r=1;:::;n ) with p r´8 > < > :
where I k´f 1; :::; kg and J k´f k + 1; :::; ng;
and F : R 2 + ! R is any strictly increasing function. 6 Clearly, in ¡ F (k); the set of all independent players is I k ; and the set of all interdependent players is J k : (By de…nition, there are jI k j = k many independent players, and jJ k j = n ¡ k many interdependent players in ¡ F (k).) The crucial interpretation is that, while we only observe the payo¤s associated with the game ¡ as outsiders, the associated players actually engage in playing ¡ F (k) instead of ¡:
In this paper, we wish to analyze the nature of Nash equilibrium of an arbitrary ¡ F (k): However, it must be noted at the outset that there are two immediate di¢culties that we shall often assume away in the general analysis that follows. First, the existence of a Nash equilibrium of ¡ F (k) is rather di¢cult to establish in general. Even if we posit the standard requirement of quasiconcavity of ¼ r in x r for all r (along with continuity of ¼ r ; and compactness and convexity of X), the payo¤ function p j ; j 2 J k ; need not inherit this property. Even the deeper existence theorems established in the literature (such as those of Topkis, 1979 , Nishimura and Friedman, 1981 , and Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986 ) are generally not helpful in settling this existence problem. It appears that the best strategy at this stage is to ignore this problem, and search for some qualitative properties of the equilibria of ¡ F (k); when it exists. In fact, in many examples of economic interest (such as Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies, common pool resource and public good games, arms races, etc.) one can directly verify that the set of equilibria of ¡ F (k) is nonempty, and hence our line of attack turns out to be fruitful.
The second di¢culty is the analytical intractability of certain non-symmetric equilibria of an arbitrary ¡ F (k). The analysis is greatly simpli…ed when we focus instead on the 6 As the proofs given in the appendix will readily reveal, our entire development remains intact if each p j was de…ned in terms of a strictly increasing F j for all j 2 J k where F j1 6 = F j2 was allowed for any j 1 6 = j 2 :
intragroup symmetric Nash equilibria of a given game ¡ F (k); denoted N sym (¡ F (k)); which is de…ned as
where [t] l denotes the l¡replication of the object t.
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One could, of course, advance a "focal point" argument to justify interest in N sym (¡ F (k)): Perhaps more importantly, we shall observe that in most of the economic examples considered below, we actually have
) so a focus on intragroup symmetric equilibria is unrestrictive. This is trivially the case in all two person games.
Finally, let us clarify what we mean by "studying the nature of N sym (¡ F (k))" given a ¡ 2 G. Put precisely, we are interested in identifying some general subclasses of G where interdependent players have a de…nite strategic advantage over the independent players in terms of monetary payo¤s, that is, where
There are several concrete economic motivations behind this inquiry as already hinted in the previous section. Indeed, whether or not interdependent players (who do not directly maximize their absolute payo¤s) obtain higher (or strictly higher) absolute payo¤s than all independent players (who do target the maximization of their absolute payo¤s) is a question of great interest in evolutionary theories of preference formation. The same inquiry also turns out to be quite relevant with respect to some recent approaches in oligopoly theory where the distinction between managerial incentives and the objectives of the …rm is explicitly modeled. Such applications of our basic analysis will be discussed in some detail in Section 4.
Main Results

Supermodular Games
An n-person normal form game ¡ 2 G is said to be supermodular whenever X is a sublattice of R`and
; y 2 X n and r = 1; :::; n,
7
By an immediate application of the symmetry condition (1) we have
; this observation will prove extremely useful in what follows.
where x _ y is the lowest upper bound of fx; yg in X (with respect to %) and x^y is the greatest lower bound of fx; yg in X: We say that ¡ is strictly supermodular if the above inequality holds strictly for all r and x; y 2 X n such that fx _ y; x^yg 6 = fx; yg: Supermodular games correspond to games in which the actions of two distinct players are strategic complements in the sense that the best response correspondences of the players are increasing (Bulow et al., 1985) . It is well known that if ¼ r is C 2 ; then ¡ is supermodular if and only if @ 2 ¼ r =@x r @x q > 0 for all r 6 = q (Topkis, 1978) . Moreover, any supermodular ¡ 2 G has at least one symmetric equilibrium, provided that X is compact, and ¼ r (¢; x ¡r ) is upper semicontinuous for all x ¡r 2 X n¡1 (Topkis, 1979, and Vives, 1990 ). 8, 9 We next introduce another interesting subclass of G that we will work with.
Definition. An n-person normal form game ¡ 2 G is said to be positively (negatively) action-monotonic if, for all x 2 X n ;
Action-monotonicity is a curious property that requires a tight connection (a certain kind of isotonicity) between payo¤s and actions. While it is not a standard condition for normal form games, action-monotonicity is nevertheless satis…ed by a wide variety of symmetric games. In general, any ¡ 2 G with ¼ r (x) = ª(x r ; Ã(x)); r = 1; :::; n where ª : X £ R ! R + is strictly increasing (decreasing) in the …rst component and Ã :
X n ! R is symmetric, is positively (negatively) action-monotonic. We shall observe below that several widely studied symmetric games, including common pool resource extraction and public good games, and Cournot oligopolies with constant average costs, are special cases of this general formulation.
The …rst main result of this section provides an answer to the general question stated in the previous section within the broad class of all action-monotonic strictly supermodular games: Theorem 1. Let k 2 f1; :::; n ¡ 1g and take any strictly increasing F : R 2 + ! R: Let ¡ 2 G be strictly supermodular with X being any chain. If ¡ is action-monotonic, then for anyx 2 N sym (¡ F (k)) withx 1 6 =x n ; we have
Unless otherwise is explicitly stated, all references to topological properties are to be considered in terms of the Euclidean topology throughout this paper. 9 ¼ r : X ! R is said to be upper (lower) semicontinuous, if, for any x; x m 2 X; m = 1; :::; lim
Theorem 1 states that at any intragroup symmetric equilibrium of an action monotonic strictly supermodular game, the absolute payo¤s to interdependent players are strictly greater than those to independent players, unless both groups take the same equilibrium action. There are indeed examples of commonly studied games which satisfy the requirements of the theorem and in which strict inequality of payo¤s obtains; a number of these are discussed in Section 3.3 below. Remark 1. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) have introduced a weakening of the supermodularity concept, namely quasisupermodularity, which is nevertheless strong enough to allow fruitful analysis (especially when X is a chain): an n-person normal form game ¡ 2 G is said to be quasisupermodular, if
for all x; y 2 X n and r = 1; :::; n: We note that Theorem 1 remains valid when we replace strict supermodularity with quasisupermodularity, provided that k 2 f1; :::; n ¡ 2g: That this claim is true becomes apparent upon close inspection of the proof of Theorem 1 which is given in the appendix. k
The signi…cance of Theorem 1 is limited, however, by the fact that it deals only with intragroup symmetric equilibria. The following corollary, in contrast, keeps the hypotheses of linear ordering and action-monotonicity of Theorem 1, but deals with all Nash equilibria for the special case when there is only one interdependent player. Corollary 1. Let F : R 2 + ! R be any strictly increasing function. For any actionmonotonic and strictly supermodular ¡ 2 G where X is any chain, and for anyx 2 N (¡ F (n¡ 1)) withx i 6 =x n for some i 2 I n¡1 ;
Corollary 1 states that in the special case when only one of the players has interdependent preferences, this player earns a payo¤ that is at least as high as the average payo¤ earned by the remaining (independent) players. Unless all players choose the same action, moreover, the interdependent player earns a strictly higher level of absolute payo¤s than the population average. As we shall see in the next section, this is important from an evolutionary perspective, since it implies that the extinction of players with interdependent preferences cannot occur under any payo¤ monotonic evolutionary selection dynamics.
Remark 2. (a) Corollary 1 remains valid if we take X to be any lattice in R`, but assume that maxfx i : i 2 I n¡1 g 6 = ; for allx 2 N (¡ F (n ¡ 1)):
The following generalization of Corollary 1 is also true: Let k 2 f1; :::; n ¡ 1g; let X be any chain, take any strictly increasing F : R 2 + ! R; and let ¡ 2 G be action-monotonic and
As with Corollary 1, this observation (the proof of which is given in the appendix) has implications in the context of evolutionary preference formation dynamics; see Section 4.1 below. k Theorem 1 and its corollary rely on the property of action monotonicity, which a number of important supermodular games do not satisfy. Fortunately, this requirement can also be relaxed for the case in which only one of the players has interdependent preferences.
Theorem 2. Let F : R 2 + ! R be any strictly increasing function. For any strictly supermodular ¡ 2 G where X is any lattice, and for anyx 2 N sym (¡ F (n ¡ 1)) withx 1 6 =x n ;
It is worth noting that Theorem 2 dispenses with two restrictive hypotheses of Theorem 1. Indeed, X need not be linearly ordered for Theorem 2 to work; any partial order on R`(like the familiar vector dominance) would do. Moreover, this result covers all strictly supermodular games, including those that violate action-monotonicity. In particular, Theorem 2 shows that the interdependent player unambiguously holds the upper hand in any strictly supermodular two-person game ¡ 2 G with X being any lattice in R`; for
). Finally, we note that while Theorem 2 refers only to the properties of intragroup symmetric equilibria, this is not restrictive in models where independent players always choose the same equilibrium action. The examples given in Subsection 3.3 will show that this observation is at times quite useful.
We conclude this section by demonstrating that action-monotonicity alone is not su¢cient to yield any of the above results. In particular, the following example illustrates the crucial role played by supermodularity in Theorems 1 and 2.
Example. Consider the two-person normal form game ¡ 2 G represented by the bimatrix 2 6 4
(1; 1) (1; 1=2) (3; 2) (1=2; 1) (1; 1) (2; 0) (2; 3) (0; 2) (2; 2)
Here the strategy space of each agent is the chain f1; 2; 3g: This game is easily checked to be (negatively) action monotonic but not supermodular. It has three Nash equilibria, 
We therefore conclude that in this game the player with interdependent behavior is subject to a strategic disadvantage.k
Example 1 illustrates that action monotonicity is in fact consistent with the possibility of interdependent players having a strategic disadvantage against independent players. It should thus be formally clear that our main inquiry (that is, determining a general subclass of G the members of which satisfy (4)) is not a trivial one. On the other hand, we know from Theorem 1 that action monotonicity together with strict supermodularity is su¢cient for interdependent players to have a strategic advantage over the independent players. Alternative su¢cient conditions for the strategic advantage of interdependent players may be found, however, that do not rely on supermodularity. The following section deals with the case of submodular games.
Submodular Games with Spillovers
As explored by Cooper and John (1988) , among others, a wide variety of economically interesting games exhibit a negative (or positive) spillover e¤ect. In such games, an increase in the level of action taken by a player decreases (or increases) the absolute payo¤s of all other players. The strong form of this property is, however, too demanding, for it is not satis…ed by games in which players have at least one potential action which would nullify the in ‡uence of other players. For instance, in the classical Cournot model of oligopoly, a …rm may completely annihilate the e¤ect of quantity choices of other …rms on its pro…ts simply by choosing to shut down. For this reason, we shall work here with a slightly weaker notion of the spillover e¤ect (which will later be seen to be present in the Cournot game).
+ ! R is strictly increasing and k = 1; :::; n ¡ 1g:
An n-person normal form game ¡ 2 G is said to have negative spillovers, if for any x 2 A,
for all r and q 6 = r. Games with positive spillovers are de…ned dually.
It turns out that in games with negative spillovers, there is a tight connection between action monotonicity and the possibility of
The following proposition aims to drive this point home.
Lemma 1. Let k 2 f1; :::; n ¡ 1g and take any strictly increasing F : R 2 + ! R: For any ¡ 2 G with negative spillovers and anyx 2 N sym (¡ F (k));
This lemma shows that positive action-monotonicity at the equilibrium action pro…le is essentially a necessary condition for (4) to hold in the case of games with negative spillovers. It can be shown similarly that negative action monotonicity at the equilibrium action pro…le is a necessary condition for (4) to hold for games with positive spillovers.
Given that X is a sublattice of R`; an n-person normal form game ¡ 2 G is said to be submodular if
and r = 1; :::; n.
We say that ¡ is strictly submodular if the above inequality holds strictly for all r and x; y 2 X n such that fx_y; x^yg 6 = fx; yg: In contrast with supermodular games, submodular games are those in which actions of any two players are strategic substitutes in the sense that the best response maps of all players are decreasing (Bulow et al., 1985) .
Finally, we shall need the following concept for the analysis of this subsection.
Definition. An n-person normal form game ¡ 2 G is called symmetric in equilibrium if it does not possess an asymmetric Nash equilibrium, i.e.x 2 N (¡) implies that
While symmetry in equilibrium is admittedly a demanding property, it is satis…ed by a variety of commonly studied symmetric games such as the stag hunt game, prisoner's dilemma, the common pool resource game, many symmetric Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly models, and public good games. In fact, for strictly submodular games, this property is nothing other than the requirement of uniqueness of equilibrium: Lemma 2. Let ¡ 2 G be a strictly submodular game such that N (¡) 6 = ;: Then, ¡ is symmetric in equilibrium if, and only if, it has a unique equilibrium.
Our main result takes as primitives those games in G where the common strategy set of the players is convex and compact, and the payo¤ function of the rth player is continuous and quasiconcave in x r , for all r: 10 Denoting the class of all such games by G 0 ; we are now ready to state Theorem 3. Let ¡ 2 G 0 ; k 2 f1; :::; n ¡1g and take any strictly increasing F : R 2 + ! R: If ¡ is a positively (negatively) action monotonic and strictly submodular game with negative (positive) spillovers, and is symmetric in equilibrium, then, for anyx 2 N sym (¡ F (k)) such thatx 1 6 =x n and ¼ r (x) > 0 for all r; we have
In words, if a positively (negatively) action monotonic strictly submodular game with negative (positive) spillovers satis…es symmetry in equilibrium, then the interdependent players have a strategic advantage over the independent players in that at any intragroup symmetric equilibrium of the game they earn strictly greater absolute payo¤s than independent players, provided that both groups take distinct equilibrium actions. The examples of the next subsection will illustrate the power of this observation.
Remark 3. Lemma 1 has demonstrated the necessity of action monotonicity for the conclusion of Theorem 3 to hold. Since we think of submodular games with spillovers as primitives in the above analysis, the only question about the tightness of this result concerns the relaxation of the symmetry in equilibrium condition. To see that this condition too cannot be completely relaxed in Theorem 3, consider the following "hawk-dove" game represented by the bimatrix " (10; 10) (5; 15) (15; 5) (1; 1) # and de…ne ¡ as its mixed strategy extension. One can easily verify that ¡ satis…es all the hypotheses of Theorem 3 except for symmetry in equilibrium, and that ((1; 0); (0; 1)) 2
Hence there exists an equilibrium in which the player with interdependent preferences obtains a strictly lower absolute payo¤. k 10 We note that assuming compactness of X is often less restrictive than assuming completeness of X as a chain (i.e. postulating that fsup Y; inf Y g ½ X for all Y µ X), provided that % is a completion of the coordinatewise ordering. For instance, since the order topology derived from the lexicographic ordering is …ner than the Euclidean topology, and since a chain is compact in its order topology i¤ it is complete (Birkho¤, 1963, p.242, Theorem 12), every complete chain w.r.t. the lexicographic ordering must be compact in the Euclidean topology. It is also worth noting that if X is a complete lattice with respect to the coordinatewise ordering, then, and only then, it is compact in the Euclidean topology (see Frink, 1942 , Theorems 5 and 9).
In closing, we note that one can again relax the requirement of action-monotonicity when there is only one interdependent player in the game. The following is then a counterpart to Theorem 2.
Theorem 4. Let
Theorem 4 provides su¢cient conditions for the single player with interdependent preferences to have a strategic advantage with respect to the remaining players in submodular games. As with Theorem 2, this result has evolutionary implications. For any game which satis…es the conditions of the Theorem, a population consisting exclusively of players with independent preferences will be vulnerable to invasion by the emergence of a single player with negatively interdependent preferences, under any payo¤ monotonic evolutionary selection dynamics. This intuition will be formalized in Section 4.1 below.
Examples
The usefulness of the results presented in the previous section hinges on the degree to which they may be applied to games of economic interest. In this subsection we present three classes of such examples. Here, ! stands for the private endowment of agent r; and the action x r is interpreted as her input (e¤ort) supply to a shared production process or her contribution to the provision of a public good. In turn, the function u is thought of as the utility provided by privately consuming own input (or the utility of private consumption good), and the function v as the utility of jointly produced good (or the public good, respectively). In accordance with the general analysis presented in the previous subsections, we assume in what follows that players k + 1 to n maximize an objective function of the form (3) for some di¤erentiable F with F 1 ; F 2 > 0:
It is easy to see that ¡ is negatively action monotonic and has positive spillovers. To see that ¡ is symmetric in equilibrium, take anyx 2 N (¡) and letx r <x q for some players r and q. We must then have @¼ r (x)=@x r 6 0 6 @¼ q (x)=@x q while u 00 < 0 implies that
Hence ¡ is symmetric in equilibrium, and the conditions u 0 (0+) = 1 and u 0 (!) < v 0 (0) ensure that any equilibriumx is interior, i.e.,x 2 (0; !) n for anyx 2 N (¡). The same reasoning also shows thatx i1 =x i2 for all i 1 ; i 2 2 I k and allx 2 N (¡ F (k)). (Notice that the last observation implies that N sym (¡ F (n ¡ 1)) = N (¡ F (n ¡ 1))). Finally, we claim that the equilibrium actions of independent and interdependent agents are di¤erent from each other, i.e.,x i 6 =x j for any (i; j) 2 I k £ J k and anyx 2 N sym (¡ F (k)): Note thatx i 2 [0; !) for all i 2 I k since u 0 (0+) = 1: Now suppose that for each player i 2 I k , we havex i 2 (0; !) so that @¼ i (x)=@x i = 0: If there was an (i; j) 2 I k £ J k such thatx i =x j ; we would have
while we must have @p j (x)=@x j = 0 sincex j =x i 2 (0; !): Hence, when independent players take an interior action,x i 6 =x j for any (i; j) 2 I k £ J k and anyx 2 N (¡ F (k)): Finally suppose that for each player i 2 I k , we havex i = 0. If it were also the case that for each player j 2 J k , we havex j = 0, thenx could not be an equilibrium since u 0 (!) < v 0 (0) and independent players could bene…t from a unilateral deviation. Hencex i 6 =x j for any
Now, if v is strictly convex (concave), then the game is strictly supermodular (submodular ) and since we have established above thatx 1 6 =x n for anyx 2 N sym (¡ F (k)); we may use Theorem 1 (Theorem 3) to conclude that at any intragroup symmetric equilibrium the agents with interdependent preferences obtain strictly higher absolute payo¤s than do agents with independent preferences. Moreover, since we have found above that N sym (¡ F (n ¡ 1)) = N (¡ F (n¡1)), if there is only one interdependent player in the game, it follows from Theorem 2 (Theorem 4, resp.) that this player receives a strictly higher absolute payo¤ than any independent agent at any Nash equilibrium of ¡ F (n ¡ 1): k II. Diamond-type Search Models. Here we consider a standard search model (cf. Diamond, 1982, and Roberts, 1990 ) that is characterized by a game ¡ 2 G in which X = [0; »] ; 0 < » < 1; and x r 2 X is interpreted as the search e¤ort by player r: The absolute payo¤ function of player r on X n is given as
¡ C(x r ) + K; r = 1; :::; n where K is a constant, and f and C are twice di¤erentiable functions with
As usual, we interpret C as standing for the private cost of search e¤ort.
It is easy to verify that while ¡ is supermodular, it is not action monotonic, and therefore, Theorem 1 does not apply to this game. Yet, from Theorem 2 we can deduce the following: if there is only one interdependent player in ¡; then she earns strictly higher absolute payo¤s than any other independent player at any intragroup symmetric equilibrium. In fact, this applies to any equilibrium since we again have N sym (¡ F (n ¡ 1)) = N (¡ F (n ¡ 1)) for any strictly increasing F . To see this, suppose for contradiction thatx i 1 >x i 2 for any i 1 ; i 2 
so that we must have
But these equations cannot hold simultaneously, for, given that f 0 > 0 and C 00 > 0; the hypothesisx i1 >x i2 implies that f ( P r6 =i1x r ) < f (
Furthermore, by a reasoning similar to the one used in the previous example we can show that the interdependent agent's equilibrium action is di¤erent from that of any of the independent agents. We thus obtain the following result: when there is only one interdependent player in the population, at any equilibrium of the Diamond-type search model considered above, the interdependent player obtains strictly higher payo¤s than everybody else. k III. Arms Races. An action for a country is a level of military expenditure. We assume that B : [¡³; ³] ! R and C : X ! R + are twice continuously di¤erentiable and satisfy:
The constant K > C(») is introduced into the payo¤ function just to ensure that ¼ r (x) > 0 for all
n and r = 1; ::; n: Obviously, this does not alter the strategic structure of ¡ in any way. 12 The present formulation of this example is again taken from Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
In addition, assume that for any pair of actions (x 1 ; x 2 ) in X 2 , B(x 1 ¡ x 2 ) ¡ C(x 1 ) > 0 (this is simply to ensure that payo¤s are positive at all admissible action pro…les). Now suppose that country 2 decides to act aggressively and thus aims at maximizing an objective function of the type (3) for some di¤erentiable F with F 1 ; F 2 > 0. Country 1 simply maximizes its own material payo¤ ¼ 1 .
It is easy to see that strict concavity of B guarantees that ¡ is strictly supermodular. Therefore, while ¡ need not be action-monotonic (so that Theorem 1 need not apply), by using Theorem 2 we may conclude that ¼ 2 (x) > ¼ 1 (x) for allx 2 N (¡ F (1)) withx 1 6 =x 2 : However, since C 0 (³) > B 0 (0) > C 0 (0); we havex 1 2 (0; ³) so that, by a similar reasoning used in the analysis of input games above, we can show that nox 2 N (¡ F (1)) can satisfŷ (¡ F (1) ). In other words, the country with the interdependent preferences has a strictly higher payo¤ at any equilibrium. Since the present game is with negative spillovers, Lemma 1 allows us to say more: the country with the interdependent objective function will be the one that is more heavily armed at any equilibrium. This is certainly in line with the intuition that country 2 is a more aggressive player than country 1. k
Economic Applications
Theory of Preference Formation
An important question in the theory of individual preferences that has recently received some attention is whether individuals are indeed absolute payo¤ maximizers as is usually assumed in conventional economic models (see Frank, 1987 , Bolton, 1991, Cole et al., 1992, Bisin and Verdier, 1996, and Koçkesen et al., 1997, among others.) The alternative hypothesis is that an individual's well-being is determined not only by the intrinsic utility of her material consumption, but also her relative material standing in the society; the so-called relative income hypothesis (or keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect). There is now substantial evidence suggesting that the "relative standing" concern of individuals is indeed a fact of life (see Frank, 1987, Clark and Oswald, 1996 , and references cited therein).
One way in which the nature of individual preferences can be explained is by an appeal to evolutionary arguments. The evolutionary theory of preference formation is based on the premise that individual preferences come to being as a result of an unplanned process of transmission in which children inherit the preferences of their parents or peers either by genetic transmission, imitation or socialization. The population composition is typically assumed to evolve according to an (absolute) payo¤ monotonic evolutionary selection dynamic: those behaviors which yield the highest material rewards are replicated with greatest frequency from one generation to the next. If one type of behavior persistently outperforms all others, it will be the sole surviving behavior in the long run. 13 Indeed, Friedman (1953) justi…ed the independence of preferences by claiming that a pattern of behavior that does not maximize one's own material payo¤s will eventually be driven to extinction. Based on the results of the previous section, the validity of this evolutionary argument is clearly questionable in a great many strategic environments. In this section, by a straightforward application of our previous results, we shall demonstrate formally that evolution may well favor the emergence of at least some individuals with interdependent preferences as opposed to a homogeneous population of absolute payo¤ maximizers.
Consider a discrete time overlapping generations scenario in which each person lives for two periods and asexually produces a …nite number of children in the second period of her life. In period ¿ ; there are n ¿ many individuals in the society who are in the …rst period of their lives. These individuals interact with each other through playing an n ¿ -person game
is the set of all n ¿ -person symmetric games that have`-dimensional action spaces and that satisfy (2):
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Suppose that at some period ¿ 0 , all individuals in the population have independent preferences, that is, they seek to maximize their absolute payo¤s. Suppose further that in the subsequent period ¿ 0 + 1, one of the young individuals turns out (for instance by random mutation) to have negatively interdependent preferences. The question that we wish to address is the following: if the population composition evolves under pressure of di¤erential material payo¤s, as is normally assumed, will it tend to return to it's original monomorphic state or diverge further from it? In other words, is a monomorphic population of absolute payo¤ maximizers locally stable under payo¤ monotonic evolutionary selection dynamics if the emergence of individuals with negatively interdependent preferences is permitted? The answer, of course, depends on the particular structure of f¡ ¿ g 1 ¿=1 and the postulated selection dynamics. The results of the previous section, however, allows us to give a negative answer to this question under considerably general circumstances.
The idea that a monomorphic population of absolute payo¤ maximizers is locally stable under all payo¤ monotonic selection dynamics is captured by the following stability concept.
Definition. Let ¡ ¿ 2 G ¿ ; ¿ 2 N; and take any strictly increasing F : R 2 + ! R: We say that independent preferences are evolutionarily F -stable if, for all ¿ , there exists some 13 There are several applications of this approach in the economics literature, including the evolution of risk aversion, altruism among kin, and systematic expectational biases; see Koçkesen et al. (1997) for references. 14 The evolutionary scenario considered here is one in which each individual interacts with each other member of the population in each period (the "playing the …eld" model). An alternative would be to consider interaction that occurs in randomly matched subgroups drawn from the population in each period. The case of pairwise random matching is explored in Koçkesen et al. (1997) .
They are said to be evolutionarily unstable if they are not evolutionarily F -stable for any strictly increasing F .
This particular notion of evolutionary stability is a straightforward re ‡ection of the corresponding …nite population stability concepts advanced by Scha¤er (1989) and Vega-Redondo (1996, p. 32) in our framework. It says that independent preferences are evolutionarily unstable if an originally monomorphic population composed only of independent agents does not stand a chance of expelling any mutant negatively interdependent behavior. 15 Needless to say, given a particular game sequence
; if independent preferences were evolutionarily unstable in the sense de…ned above, then they would be unstable under any deterministic (absolute) payo¤ monotonic selection dynamics (such as the replicator dynamics) which require that the share of independent agents in the population grows if and only if they obtain, on average, higher absolute payo¤s than interdependent agents in the stage game. Our notion of evolutionary instability is therefore quite a general one subsuming most of the instability concepts used in evolutionary game theory. Moreover, it does not require us to address the problem of equilibrium selection: if independent preferences are evolutionarily unstable, then, regardless of which equilibrium is selected in each period, there will be no pressure on the population composition to return to its initial monomorphic state once a player with negatively interdependent preferences of any kind has emerged.
Before stating the main result of this section, we introduce the following re…nement of
) and all strictly increasing F g, for all ¿ 2 N. The class G ¿ ¤ is a re…nement of G ¿ which requires that all independent agents take the same action at any equilibrium of ¡ ¿ F (n ¿ ¡ 1). This requirement is completely unrestrictive in most of the economic applications discussed in this paper. For instance, in all the n ¿ -person games considered in Section 3.3 (along with the Cournot oligopoly discussed next), all independent agents take the same equilibrium actions no matter how many interdependent agents are in the population. All these games are thus members of G Proof
) for all ¿ ; n 2 N and all strictly increasing F: The claims are thus established upon applying Theorems 2 and 4, respectively.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 shows that in a great variety of economic circumstances (which include all of the games presented in Section 3.3), there are evolutionary reasons to believe that the population will not be composed only of absolute payo¤ maximizers in the long run; one should expect the presence of at least some individuals with negatively interdependent preferences. 17 Moreover, even when preferences are acquired as a result of the deliberate socialization e¤orts of parents who seek to inculcate preferences in their children with a view to providing them with greater material payo¤s in their adult lives, the resulting population dynamics will be payo¤ monotonic and the above result applies. At the very least, this calls into question the almost universal practice of modeling economic agents as absolute payo¤ maximizers.
The Cournot Oligopoly
Objective functions which incorporate relative payo¤ concerns are particularly easy to justify in the case of …rms which separate management from ownership. In the presence of some common uncertainty which a¤ects all …rms within an industry, the performance of other …rms may provide valuable information about a manager's ability or e¤ort which is otherwise unobservable to the owners. Owners may therefore bene…t from writhing contracts with managers in which the compensation of the latter is based, in part, on the performance of their …rm relative to that of other …rms, or relative to some industry average. 18 This, in turn, would provide an incentive for managers (even if they are themselves absolute payo¤ maximizers) to pursue the maximization of objective functions which have the form 16 By Corollary 1, the same conclusion also holds for all strictly supermodular and action monotonic
where the related action spaces are arbitrary chains in R`.
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In fact, in the context of certain speci…c games, more can be said. For instance, if the individuals are playing standard commons or public goods games (not necessarily with additively separable payo¤ functions), then one can show that the unique stable population composition with respect to any absolute payo¤ monotonic dynamics is monomorphic with all individuals being interdependent. For a proof and various extensions of this result, see Koçkesen et al. (1997) . 18 See, among others, Holmström (1979 Holmström ( , 1982 and Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983). Gibbons and Murphy (1990) provide supportive empirical evidence. of interdependent preferences. 19 The results of Section 3 can thus be used to show that such contracts may have the unplanned e¤ect of yielding a strategic advantage to a …rm, enabling it to achieve a higher level of pro…tability than its pro…t-maximizing competitors.
Consider an oligopolistic industry composed of n …rms with identical cost structures producing a homogenous product. Firm r chooses an output level x r 2 X = [0; ¹ Q]; 0 < ¹ Q < 1; where ¹ Q is interpreted as the capacity limit on a …rm's output level. The pro…t function of …rm r is given by
; r = 1; :::; n;
where the inverse demand function P is a strictly positive and twice di¤erentiable function on [0; n ¹ Q] and the cost function C is a nonnegative, twice di¤erentiable function on [0; ¹ Q]: We make the standard assumptions that demand is downward sloping and average cost is non-decreasing:
We also assume that the game is strictly submodular:
Note that concavity of P would imply (5) . Denote the resulting Cournot game by ¡ C 2 G, and make the additional assumptions that P (n ¹ Q) > C( ¹ Q)= ¹ Q, to ensure positive pro…ts for each …rm at any output pro…le, and P (0) > C 0 (0), to ensure that each …rm produces a strictly positive amount at any Cournot equilibrium. The latter condition also guarantees that ¡ C has the negative spillovers property. Moreover, by means of an argument similar to that used in the case of input games above, one can show that this game is symmetric in equilibrium. Since it is easy to verify the existence of an equilibrium, we may conclude by Lemma 2 that ¡ C has in fact a unique equilibrium. Our …rst result shows that, in the case of a duopoly, one can obtain a particularly strong result regarding the relative performance of an interdependent …rm in competition with an independent …rm. Proposition 2. Take any Cournot duopoly ¡ C in which the …rms produce below full capacity in equilibrium and let F : R 2 + ! R be strictly increasing. Then, at anyx 2
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Another reason why interdependent preferences could be of interest for the theory of industrial organization is the close connection between the relative pro…ts and the market share of a …rm. For instance, provided that average costs are constant and relative pro…ts are well-de…ned, we have ¼ r (x)=¹ ¼(x) = x r =¹ x for all x: Therefore, negatively interdependent preferences in the context of Cournot competition with constant average costs encompasses the case of sales or market share maximization on the part of managers.
i.e., the …rm with interdependent preferences obtains a strictly higher pro…t than does the independent …rm.
Proof. First we show that at anyx 2 N (¡ C F (1)),x 1 6 =x 2 . Suppose, by way of contradiction, thatx 1 =x 2 = a. If a = ¹ Q; then by symmetry of ¡ C ; we must have
g which is outlawed by hypothesis. If, on the other hand, a = 0; then N (¡ C ) = f(0; 0)g which contradicts P (0) > C 0 (0): Hence, a 2 (0; ¹ Q). But then we must have @¼ 1 (x)=@x 1 = 0 and @p 2 (x)=@x 2 = 0; while these two equations cannot hold simultaneously as can be veri…ed by a reasoning similar to the one used in the input games example of Section 3.3. Hencex 1 6 =x 2 and, since ¡ C is strictly submodular with negative spillovers, and is symmetric in equilibrium, the result follows from Theorem 4.
A similar result can be established for the Cournot oligopoly model with n …rms which operate under constant marginal costs. In this case it is easily veri…ed that ¡ C is positively action monotonic and, moreover, that all equilibria of ¡ C F (k) are such that all independent players take the same action. As long as at least one …rm produces under its capacity in any Cournot equilibrium of ¡ C , it can be shown that at anyx 2 N sym (¡ C F (k)),x i 6 =x n for all i 2 I k , so that the application of Theorem 3 immediately yields ¼ i (x) < ¼ n (x) for all i 2 I k . Furthermore, in the special case when k = n ¡ 1, all Nash equilibria of ¡ C F (k) are intragroup symmetric. Hence, if a single …rm in an industry has an objective function that places some weight on relative pro…ts, it will be more pro…table in any equilibrium than all of its pro…t maximizing competitors.
For even a more general class of Cournot oligopoly models in which we relax the assumption of linear cost functions, obtaining similar results requires one additional condition to ensure that the game is action monotonic. 
is positively action-monotonic. The same reasoning used in the Proof of Proposition 2 can be used to demonstrate that
action monotonic, strictly submodular with negative spillovers, and is symmetric in equilibrium, the result follows from Theorem 3.Q.E.D.
To summarize, in many Cournot oligopoly models, managers who include relative pro…t considerations in their decision making process (say, due to incentive contracts) will obtain 20 A su¢cient condition for this is
higher pro…ts in equilibrium than the industry average. 21 In view of Lemma 1, which in the present context links the pro…ts of a …rm to its production, the results of this section provide an explanation for the anecdotal observation that some industries (such as the personal computer industry) are characterized by very unequal markets shares and a high degree of concentration despite the fact that the constituent …rms operate under remarkably similar cost structures. This explanation is somewhat novel, since is does not rely on the di¤eren-tiation of products and advertising activities of …rms which are usually claimed to account for this phenomenon.
Finally, the …ndings of this section have immediate implications for the long run survival of …rms within an industry if the entry and exit of …rms occurs on the basis of pro…tability. The idea of Darwinian selection in industrial dynamics is not a new one; several authors have argued that competition in an industry resembles biological competition in that more pro…table practices are replicated more rapidly (see, for instance, Alchian, 1950 , Friedman, 1953 , and Sha¤er, 1989 . Along these lines, our results imply that the …rm behavior that corresponds to an interdependent objective function will thrive at the expense of absolute pro…t maximizing behavior in the long run.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have tried to uncover the generality of the statement that negatively interdependent preferences provide one with a strategic advantage over agents who are motivated exclusively by a concern with their own material payo¤s. It turns out that there is a broad class of strategic environments in which such an advantage is found to exist, and that there is a close connection between this phenomenon and the properties of strategic complementarity and substitutability in games. The …nding that those with interdependent preferences earn greater absolute payo¤s than do (absolute) payo¤ maximizers in such environments has direct implications for theories of preference formation and managerial decision making. In light of our theoretical results, the assumption of absolute payo¤ maximizing behavior on the part of individuals or …rms should not be made as routinely as is done in applications of game theory (on this point, see also Frank, 1987, and Bolton, 1991) .
There are a number of directions in which the present work may be extended. The results of Koçkesen, et al. (1997) prove that the su¢cient conditions provided here for interdependent players to outperform independent players are not necessary. Therefore, determining precisely the class of all normal-form games such that this phenomenon occurs remains an 21 See also Vickers (1984) , Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) for a similar conclusion in the context of closely related models where the separation of the owner and manager incentives are explicitly modeled.
open problem. It also remains to be seen whether results analogous to ours can be obtained in extensive form and dynamic games. Finally, we stress that our entire analysis has been conducted under the hypothesis of complete information. This is certainly a considerable limitation; entertaining the notion that interdependent preferences are a plausible alternative to the standard assumption of independent preferences arguably necessitates that the game at hand should be modeled as an incomplete information game. 22 The incomplete information issue is an important one which we hope to address in future research. 22 As noted by Bolton (1997 Bolton ( , p. 1112 in the context of the ultimatum bargaining environment, "... the marginal rate of substitution between absolute and relative money most likely varies by individual, making utility functions private information."
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume …rst that ¡ is positively action-monotonic, and take anŷ
In what follows, we shall show that a -b must hold; this will yield the claim by virtue of positive action-monotonicity. Let us assume for contradiction then that a Â b:
Since ¼ 1 = p 1 ; by de…nition of Nash equilibrium,
[b] n¡k ) so that, by using (1) with ¾(1) = n; ¾(n) = 1 and ¾(r) = r for all r = 2 f1; ng; we …nd
By strict supermodularity, therefore,
holds. Now suppose ¼ n (x) = 0: From (2) and (6) it follows that ¼ n (x ¡n ; a) > 0; and since F is strictly increasing,
contradicting thatx is a Nash equilibrium. Thus, we assume henceforth that
; t) for all t 2 X; we have
by (6) and strict monotonicity of F: By the symmetry of ¡, it is readily observed that
and
But by the hypotheses of a Â b and positive action-monotonicity, we must have
(This inequality holds as an equality i¤ k = n ¡ 1.) Therefore using the above inequality along with (7), we may conclude that
But by the symmetry of ¡; we have P ¼ r (x) = k¼ 1 (x)+(n¡k)¼ n (x); and therefore the above
However, since a Â b; this contradicts positive action-monotonicity of ¡; and we are done.
To complete the proof of the theorem, assume now that ¡ is negatively action-monotonic. De…ne ¡ ¡ = (f¡Xg i=1;:::;n ; f¼ ¡ i g i=1;:::;n g 2 G where ¼ ¡ (x) = ¼(¡x) for all x 2 ¡X: Since, for all x 2 ¡X; x i Â x j implies ¡x i Á ¡x j ; 23 the negative action-monotonicity of ¡ yields
is positively actionmonotonic. Therefore, by the …rst part of the theorem established above, we have
The proof is complete.
Proof of Corollary 1. We assume that ¡ is positively action-monotonic, for the case of negative action-monotonicity can be easily settled as in the proof of Theorem 1. If
; then the claim follows from Theorem 1. So assume thatx i 6 =x i 0 for some i; i 0 2 I n¡1 ; and letx 1 be the maximum of fx 1 ; :::;x n¡1 g w.r.t. %; relabelling if necessary. (Since % is a linear order, maxfx 1 ; :::;x n¡1 g 6 = ;.) We now proceed as in the proof of Theorem 1 to eliminate the trivial case of ¼ n (x) = 0; and to obtain the corresponding version of (7) in this case with ¼ n (x) > 0:
(Implicit in this inequality is the fact that ¼ n (x ¡n ;x 1 ) > 0 which is guaranteed by (6).) But sincex 1 %x i for all i 2 I n¡1 andx 1 Âx i for some i 2 I n¡1 ; by positive action-monotonicity, we have
; and the result follows.
Proof of Remark 2 (b).
Assume that ¡ is positively action-monotonic, w.l.o.g.. Let
x 1 = maxfx i : i 2 I k g; and notice that claim is immediate by positive action-monotonicity if x n %x 1 : So, letx 1 Âx n : Since we can eliminate the trivial case of ¼ n (x) = 0 as in the proof of Theorem 1, let us assume that ¼ n (x) > 0: We then have
Since (R`; %) is an ordered vector space, we have
Here, the …rst inequality is derived in a way analogous to (8) , the second inequality follows from action monotonicity andx 1 %x i for all i 2 I k ; and …nally, the third inequality follows from action monotonicity andx
If a Â b; we can easily show that ¼ n (x) and ¼ n (x ¡n ; a) = ¼ n ([a] n ) are strictly positive as in the proof of Theorem 1, and then recalling that (7) was obtained above without using the action-monotonicity property, we may conclude that
which yields ¼ n (x) > ¼ 1 (x): Assume now that b Â a; and note that we can again show that
are strictly positive by using strict supermodularity as in the proof of Theorem 1. On the other hand, since
where
for otherwise, by strict supermodularity, we would …nd
which contradicts (10). Yet, (11) and the fact that p n (x) > p n ([a] n ) yield (9), completing the proof.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume thatx = ([a] k ; [b] n¡k ) for some a; b 2 X with a Â b: Then, by hypothesis, negative spillovers e¤ect, and symmetry of ¡,
and this contradicts that playing a is a best response for player
The …rst assertion follows by the completeness and antisymmetry of %.
To prove the second assertion, let k = n ¡ 1 and notice that all we have to show is that
Since ® 7 ! ®=(¿ + ®) is a strictly increasing mapping in ® > 0 for any ¿ > 0; (12) implies that
Since b is a best response of player n against
Therefore, by the negative spillovers e¤ect and symmetry of ¡, we have
which contradicts (12) .
Hence, unless a = b; ¡ cannot be strictly submodular. The converse statement trivially follows from the symmetry of ¡:
Proof of Theorem 3. This theorem is an immediate consequence of the following Lemma A. Let ¡ 2 G 0 ; k 2 f1; :::; n ¡ 1g and take any strictly increasing F : R 2 + ! R: If ¡ is a strictly submodular game with negative spillovers, and is symmetric in equilibrium, then, for anyx 2 N sym (¡ F (k)) with ¼ r (x) > 0 for all r; we havê
We claim that
To see this, let us assume for contradiction that
holds for some t 2 X with t Â b: Since ® 7 ! ®=(¿ + ®) is a strictly increasing mapping in ® > 0 for any ¿ > 0; we must then have
But since t Â b; the negative spillovers e¤ect yields ¼ r (x) > ¼ r (x ¡n ; t) for all r 6 = n so that
r=1 ¼ r (x ¡n ; t) + ¼ n (x ¡n ; t)
: But this inequality, (16) and (15) yield p n (x ¡n ; t) > p n (x) which contradicts thatx is a Nash equilibrium of ¡ F (k): Therefore, we must conclude that (14) holds. Now, for any ®;¯2 X; de…ne the correspondences K¯: X ¶ X and L ® : X ¶ X as K¯(®)´arg max Next, we claim that a 1 % a 0 : But by (13) and the fact that a 1 2 K b1 (a 1 ); we have Remark A. (a) If n = 2; we may drop the hypotheses of convexity of X and quasiconcavity of ¼ r s from the statement of Lemma A, for then one does not need Kakutani's …xed point theorem in proving that (a m ; b m ) is well-de…ned.
(b) Lemma A remains valid if the chain X is any compact convex subset of a locally convex topological vector space, and ¼ r s are continuous with respect to the subspace topology. The proof of this claim is essentially identical to that of Lemma A, the only major modi…cation being the use of Tychono¤-Fan …xed point theorem (Berge, 1963 , p.251) instead of Kakutani's theorem in proving Claim 1.
(c) Continuity of ¼ r can be weakened in Lemma A to upper semicontinuity of ¼ r and lower semicontinuity of V r (y)´max a2X ¼ r (x ¡r ; a) for all x ¡r 2 X n¡1 : (Given that ¼ r is upper semicontinuous and X is compact, V r is well-de…ned on X n¡1 :) For, we have used continuity 
